The draft auto AML guidelines explained

This method of providing exemptions is often seen in the EU, and practitioners noted that this was a rather new way of thinking on the part of the Chinese regulators. (China's anti-monopoly regime largely follows the footsteps of the EU.)

“Many of these provisions will also have an impact on companies' business models, as well as manufacturers' relationships with distributors and parts suppliers,” said Fay Zhou, partner at Linklaters in Beijing, adding that industry players need to closely monitor policy trends as they will shape compliance requirements.

|

RPM exemptions

The exemptions from prohibition provided for RPM arrangements include:

- Promotion sales of new energy cars
- Sales via dealers that act as intermediaries
- Sales via public procurement
- Sales via e-commerce*

The draft proposes to exempt companies selling new energy cars from being punished for setting resale prices during a specified nine-month promotion period, a benefit that is in line with the government's initiatives to encourage more green/electric vehicles.

The NDRC has also relieved intermediaries with some commercial risk burdens. “It acknowledges that middlemen that provide delivery, payment collection and invoicing services aren't full-sense distributors,” said Zhou.

“The middleman concept isn't adopted in the EU, but is to some extent in Japan,” she said, adding that this may be due to such business models being more common in Asia.

These “agents” or “providers” of such intermediary services involved in government purchase agreements and online sales have also been granted exemptions in the draft.

|

Customer and territorial restrictions

Prohibitions based on customer and territorial restrictions aren't actually specified in the PRC Anti-monopoly Law (AML), which instead provides a catch-all clause in Article 14.3, said Ning. (Article 14.3 of the AML states “other types of monopoly agreement”.)

But she noted that this draft neither cites Article 14.3 nor contains any catch-alls regarding these restrictions. It sets out four conditions that the NDRC may consider in giving a pass:

- Territorial restrictions that do not affect passive sales or cross-supply
- Restriction of active sales into non-allocated regions
- Restriction of direct sales to end-customers by wholesalers
- Restriction of auto parts sales by dealers to customers who use those parts to manufacture the same products as the suppliers*

It further sets a market share threshold of 25%-30% as a sort of safe harbor—those that satisfy this are eligible for an exemption from penalties for the above.

Lawyers noted that providing a range was unusual. The EU's safe harbor threshold is set at a clean 30% for a block exemption to apply.

One likely reason for doing this is that China still wants to retain some discretion in terms of defining the market and calculating market share. (There have been some discrepancies among courts and authorities in the method of calculation, and some say their limited enforcement practices require a more cautious approach here.)

“Those with 27% or 28% market shares may find it difficult to assess their situation,” said Linklaters' Zhou. “Also, the draft has yet to clarify how businesses with more than 30% market share will be evaluated, specifically whether their customer and territorial restrictions will be viewed as monopoly agreements straight away,” she said.

Michael Han, of Fangda Partners, said that the NDRC “failed to clarify whether the carmakers can automatically benefit from these exemptions as the draft is unclear on which cases qualify as individual or so-called 'presumed' exemptions.”

Although the draft states that companies will need to conduct self-assessments, “it uses the term 'presumed' exemption (tuiding huomian), which, to my understanding, means something similar to block exemption under EU rules,” he said.

This discrepancy is significant because companies need to be the ones to assert that they should be granted individual exemptions, whereas for presumed exemptions, the burden of proof arguably instead lies with the authorities if they disagree that a company is eligible.

For example, a manufacturer of new energy cars, which is provided under the RPM section, will only need to show that it is selling these specific vehicles and for the permitted promotion period length, if the presumed exemption applies. (Or, in the words of Article 15 of the AML, it will need to prove that the RPM agreement “will not seriously restrict competition in the relevant market and that it will enable consumers to share in the benefits”.)

The NDRC also specifies what it considers as unacceptable behavior:

- Restriction of passive sales by dealers
- Restriction of cross-supply between dealers
- Restriction of auto spare parts sales to end customers by dealers and repairers
- Restriction of sales of auto spare parts and other equipment by the suppliers to dealers, repairers and customers, except in OEM contracts*

These are subject to review on a case-by-case basis in order to qualify for exemption.

|

Other anti-competitive vertical restraints

The draft prohibits dominant market players from restricting spare parts suppliers from placing their own logos or trademarks on products. They are also not allowed to hinder dealers or repairers' access to spare parts of the same quality or original parts from alternative channels.

While antitrust enforcement previously focused more on the vehicle distribution segment, these rules make it clear that the NDRC will look into the after-sales market just as closely.

One section in the draft contains a long list of unreasonable behaviors determined to be anti-competitive. It identifies authorized repairers, the use and purchase of original spare parts and parallel imported cars for the repair and maintenance sector.

For dealers, tying practices and unreasonable sales and stock targets are among the mentioned restraints.

Fangda's Han pointed out that the provision that prevents distributors from forcing providers to accept “unreasonable” sales targets could have a damaging impact on the market and interfere with the contractual freedom of parties.

“It appears that the NDRC finds an issue with certain relationships between carmakers and distributors in terms of unfair dealing, but I'd argue that this doesn't necessarily give rise to competition problems,” he said, adding that if the problem lies in the contract, the distributor can challenge its validity.

The regulator's reasoning is based on the perception that the manufacturers have a stronger market position, but the PRC Anti-unfair Competition Law introduced the idea that if one party has greater bargaining power, it should not force any commercial constraints upon the counterparty, Han explained.

|

Why the auto industry?

The auto industry is quite unique that it involves extremely high-value consumer products that entail serious risks and implications if the standards of safety and product liability are not met, said King & Wood Mallesons' Ning.

She added that the Measures of Branded Automobile Sales enacted in 2005 contributed to the unbalanced relationship between carmakers and distributors. This was criticized for being the breeding ground of alleged monopolies in both the sales and the after-sales markets.

“Regardless, the breakthroughs envisaged with the new concepts introduced in this draft will open up the floor to all sorts of approaches and interpretations by legal counsel,” Ning said.

By Katherine Jo

*This Winston & Strawn alert lists the exemptions

中国汽车制造商必须重新核查其合规标准，以及与所有供应商和经销商的合同，因为最新版反垄断规定草案重点针对该行业的交叉垂直关系，并对所有从业者规定了要求和禁令。

国家发改委在 2016 年 3 月 23 日发布《关于汽车业的反垄断指南（征求意见稿）》，其中针对特定垄断协议提供豁免，并明确了反竞争行为。

“汽车从业者将需要针对销售政策以及供应和经销结构进行检查和自我合规审查，涉及方面包括售后服务、配件、维修和制造生产，”金杜律师事务所反垄断和国际贸易主管宁宣凤说道，“此草案涵盖了所有这些关系，并明确界定业务链中的各个环节。”

发改委不仅提出了新概念，还以不同以往定规的方式起草了这一指南。该指南规定了四种特例豁免情境（分别针对转售价格维持 (RPM) 违规、地域和客户限制），并列出反竞争行为的具体类型。

这种提供豁免的方式常见于欧盟，而从业者注意到，这对于中国监管机构是一种较为新颖的思考方式。（中国的反垄断机制在很大程度上参照欧盟做法）。

“其中很多规定还将对公司的业务模式，以及制造商与经销商和零件供应商的关系产生影响，”年利达律师事务所北京合伙人周越表示，“行业参与者需要密切关注政策趋势，以了解合规要求。”

|

RPM 特例豁免

针对 RPM 协议提供的特例豁免包括：

对新能源汽车推广期的销售
通过仅承担中间商角色的经销商进行销售
通过政府采购的销售
通过电子商务进行销售

此草案拟定豁免销售新能源汽车的公司不因在特定九个月推广期设定转售价格而受罚，这一利好与政府推广环保/电动汽车的计划保持一致。

发改委还为中介机构免除了一些商业风险负担。“此草案认定提供交车、收款、开票服务的中间商不属于完全意义上的经销商，”周越说道，

“欧盟没有此中间商概念，但在日本具有类似角色，”她还补充道，这可能是因为此类业务模式在亚洲较为常见。

参与政府采购协议和网上销售的此类中介机构服务“代理”或“提供商”也获得了此草案的豁免。

|

客户和地域限制

宁宣凤表示，《中华人民共和国反垄断法》(《反垄断法》) 实际上未明确指明基于客户和地域限制的禁令，而是在第 14 条第(三)项中提供了笼统规定。（《反垄断法》第 14 条第(三)项规定为“其他垄断协议”。）

但她表示，此草案并未引用第 14 条第(三)项，也不包含任何有关这些限制的笼统规定。其中规定了发改委考虑允许的四种情况：

地域限制不影响被动销售或交叉供货
限制对未分配地区的主动销售
限制批发商对最终客户的直接销售
限制经销商向特定客户销售汽车配件，以供其使用此类配件制造与供应商相同的产品

其中还进一步规定 25%-30% 市场份额标准为“安全港”，达到此标准即可就上述行为获得处罚豁免。

律师们表示，像这样提供此类范围实属罕见。欧盟的相应“安全港”标准设为明确的 30%，以应用集体豁免。

这一差异很可能是中国仍希望在界定市场和计算市场份额时保留一定的自由裁量权。（法院和相关机构在计算方式方面存在差异，有意见认为，其有限执法实践需要更谨慎的方法。）

“具有 27% 或 28% 市场份额的企业可能难以评估自身状况，”年利达律师事务所周越说道，“而且，此草案尚未明确将如何评估市场份额超过 30% 的企业，尤其是其客户和地域限制是否将立即视为垄断协议。”

方达律师事务所的韩亮表示，发改委“未阐明汽车制造商能否自动获得豁免，因为此草案对哪些情况属于单独或所谓推定豁免并未指明。”

他还补充道，尽管此草案指出公司将需要执行自我评估，但所使用的“推定”豁免一词以我的理解有点类似于欧盟规定中的集体豁免。

这一差异意义重大，因为对于单独豁免，公司需要主张其有权获得，而对于推定豁免，则可能为相关机构负有举证责任（如果其认为公司不合规）。

例如，RPM 部分所述的新能源汽车制造商将仅需证明其在许可的促销期间销售此类特定汽车（如果适用推定豁免）。（或者，按照 AML 第 15 条，此类制造商将需要证明其 RPM 协议“不会严重限制相关市场的竞争，并且能够使消费者分享由此产生的利益。”）

发改委还明确了不可接受的行为类型：

限制经销商的被动销售
限制经销商之间的交叉供应
限制经销商和维修商向最终客户销售汽车配件
限制供应商向经销商、维修商和客户销售汽车配件和其他设备，除非根据 OEM 合同

此类行为须接受个例审核，以确定是否符合豁免资格。

|

其他反竞争垂直限制

此草案禁止市场支配地位者限制配件供应商在产品上标记其自身的徽标或商标。此类市场参与者还不得阻碍经销商或维修商使用具有相同质量的配件，或来自其他渠道的原始配件。

虽然以前的反垄断执法更重视汽车经销业务，但这些规定明确表明发改委将同样密切关注售后市场。

方达律师事务所的韩亮表示，此草案中的相关部分列出了众多确定为反竞争的不合理行为，并针对维修领域，指明授权维修商、原厂配件的使用和采购，以及平行进口车辆。

对于经销商，搭售行为、不合理的销售和库存目标都属于上述限制范围。

韩亮指出，此规定禁止经销商强迫提供商接受“不合理的”销售目标，但可能对市场造成危险影响，并干扰各方的合同自由。

“发改委似乎认为若干汽车制造商与经销商关系会引起不公平交易的问题，但我认为这未必会引起竞争问题，”他还补充道，如果合同中出现此问题，经销商可质疑其有效性。

他解释道，监管机构的理由是认为制造商具有较强的市场地位，但《中华人民共和国反不正当竞争法》规定，如果一方具有较强的议价能力，不得向对手方强加任何商业限制。

|

为何是汽车业？

金杜律师事务所的宁宣凤表示，汽车业非常独特，涉及极高价值的消费类产品，如果未达到安全标准和产品责任，会造成严重风险和影响。

她还补充道，2005 年实施的《汽车品牌销售管理实施办法》造成了汽车制造商和经销商之间的失衡关系。这一直受到抨击，视为帮助滋生销售和售后市场的涉嫌垄断。

“无论如何，此草案提出的新概念带来了突破，为法律顾问提供机会来采取各类方法和解释，”宁宣凤说道。

（作者：赵修敏）

Automakers in China must revisit their compliance standards and contracts with all their suppliers and distributors, as the latest draft antitrust rules target the industry's cross-vertical relationships and set out dos and don'ts for all players involved.

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)'s Anti-monopoly Guidelines for the Automotive Industry (Draft for Comments), issued on March 23, provide exemptions for certain monopoly agreements and outline anti-competitive practices.

“Industry players will need to audit and conduct self-compliance reviews regarding their sales policy and supply and distribution structures, including those for after-sales services, spare parts, maintenance and manufacturing,” said Susan Ning, head of antitrust and international trade at King & Wood Mallesons. “The draft covers all these relationships and clearly identifies each link in the chain,” she said.

Not only did it introduce new concepts, the NDRC drafted the Guidelines in a style that differed from its usual way of setting rules. It provided four exemption scenarios each for resale price maintenance (RPM) violations and territorial and customer restrictions, and listed specific types of anti-competitive behavior.