AML enforcement gets tough

This article is from the Competition chapter of the 2015 Annual Review and is available for download here.


Nate Bush of O'Melveny & Myers describes the practices of MOFCOM, the NDRC and SAIC, lessons from the Qualcomm and Qihoo-Tencent cases and what to expect from merger reviews

1. Can you describe the recent enforcement actions of the three competition regulators: MOFCOM, the NDRC and SAIC?

China's first comprehensive competition law, the PRC Anti-monopoly Law (AML), took effect on August 1 2008. During the seventh year of AML enforcement from August 2014 through July 2015, China's competition authorities pursued diverse antitrust enforcement actions.

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has primary authority over pricing-related violations of the AML's “conduct rules” against monopoly agreements and abuse of dominance, while the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC) has primary authority over non-pricing offenses.

The most significant AML decision of the last 12 months was the NDRC's February 9 2015 determination that Qualcomm abused its dominance in the licensing of its standard essential patents (SEPs) and the supply of baseband wireless chips, resulting in an unprecedented Rmb6.088 billion fine and extensive remedial commitments.

Other NDRC antitrust probes focused on price-fixing and resale price maintenance (RPM). On August 20 2014, the NDRC announced fines totalling Rmb1.24 billion on 12 Japanese auto parts and bearing manufacturers for price fixing. An investigative sweep of imported car distributors led to penalties for RPM and horizontal restraints involving Chinese distributors and dealers of BMW, Chrysler, VW, Audi and Mercedes Benz. The NDRC also investigated local-level price fixing and RPM in the cement and tourism industries, and requested Hebei provincial authorities to correct a policy charging higher road tolls to vehicles from other provinces.

The SAIC's antitrust enforcement decisions during the last 12 months focused on local-level violations, including abuse of dominance by local utilities or other companies with government-sanctioned monopolies, regional cartels, and tying cases.

The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) reviews certain mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures (concentrations) under the AML to determine if they will or may harm competition. MOFCOM unconditionally cleared 276 concentrations from July 2014 to June 2015. During this period, MOFCOM solicited public comments on 186 cases under the new “simple case” procedure, which was introduced in 2014 to address complaints about the duration of MOFCOM reviews. Under this policy, certain categories of simple cases that are deemed unlikely to impact Chinese consumers or markets may qualify for streamlined notification requirements, but are also subject to a 10-day public comment period. Published data suggests that most simple case reviews are completed around 30 days from formal acceptance to final clearance, substantially faster than for other cases.

MOFCOM neither blocked nor imposed conditions on any transactions during the last 12 months. However, after Applied Materials and Tokyo Electron announced on April 26 2015 that they would abandon their proposed merger based on the rejection of proposed remedies by the US Department of Justice, MOFCOM then announced on April 30 2015 that it had also advised the parties of its view that the merger would “severely” affect the interests of Chinese consumers and that the parties had abandoned the deal because their proposed remedies “failed to solve the competitive attention of the MOFCOM and the other relevant judicial districts.”

2. What have been the key changes in legislation affecting competition over the past 12 months and how did they affect the competition regime?

On April 7 2015, the SAIC finalised the Provisions for the Prohibition of Acts of Abusing Intellectual Property Rights to Eliminate or Restrict Competition (Provisions), clarifying the SAIC's approach to monopoly agreements and abuse of dominance cases involving IP rights. These rules define most IP-related AML infringements as conduct “restricting or eliminating competition,” suggesting inquiry into the actual effects of challenged practices rather than per se prohibitions. Prohibited practices include: unreasonable exclusivity, discrimination, tying and bundling of patents and refusal to license; imposition of exclusive grant-backs, non-challenge clauses and royalties for expired patents; misuse of patent pools; abuse of standard-essential patents, including patent ambush and patent hold-up; and, controversially, unreasonable refusal to license “essential facility” patents. The Provisions also establish presumptive safe harbours for certain horizontal and vertical arrangements involving IP based on the parties' combined market shares and the availability of substitute technologies.

In June 2015, it was reported that the NDRC is coordinating interagency efforts under the aegis of the Anti-monopoly Commission of the State Council (AMC) to draft new implementing measures that would apply to both the NDRC and the SAIC. These new measures would clarify the principles governing leniency, suspension of investigations, penalties and exemptions from liability for monopoly agreements under Article 15 of the AML. In addition, new IP abuse rules would be issued by the AMC. The extent to which the AMC's rules will diverge from the SAIC measures remains to be seen.

On December 4 2014, MOFCOM issued the Provisions on the Attachment of Restrictive Conditions to Concentrations of Business Operators (Trial Implementation), codifying MOFCOM's practices for the proposal, adoption, supervision and adjustment of structural, behavioural and hybrid remedies.

3. What can be learnt from the Qualcomm case with respect to licensing?

The NDRC's Qualcomm decision is instructive for SEP licensors.

Each SEP was defined as a separate product market, as relevant wireless technology standards cannot be implemented without practicing the SEP. Qualcomm was thus deemed dominant in the market for each of its SEPs. The NDRC found that Qualcomm abused its dominance by “indirectly” charging unfair high prices in licensing SEPs. (This finding of “indirect” price effects ostensibly brought the case within the ambit of the NDRC's jurisdiction over pricing-related violations of the AML rules against anti-competitive conduct.)

Qualcomm's licensing program bundled numerous patents, including currently valid SEPs as well as patents that had expired and patents that might not be essential to certain standards. The NDRC found this practice abusive, as the company bundled SEPs with non-SEPs, collected royalties for expired patents and failed to distinguish SEPs from non-SEPs. Qualcomm's licensing program also required licensees to cross-license their own relevant patents to other licensees and commit not to sue Qualcomm or other licensees for infringement. Although Qualcomm defended these safeguards against infringement actions for baseband chip suppliers and licensees as an integral part of the value of the license, the NDRC found this practice abusive as it failed to respect the value of the licensees' own IP. The NDRC also found that Qualcomm abused its dominance by basing royalties on 100% of the net wholesale value of the finished smartphones or other devices, which reflects the value of functionality not covered by Qualcomm's patents.

The NDRC's public announcement of the settlement and the public version of the final order indicate that Qualcomm committed to revise its licensing program for Chinese licensees and eliminate these practices. Qualcomm also committed to base royalties for devices sold in China on 65% (rather than 100%) of the net wholesale value. The NDRC decision does not, however, explain the legal rationale for the 65% standard or refer to the “smallest saleable unit” test or other commonly proposed standards for fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing.

4. What were the most important cases related to abuse of dominant market position? How has it been defined?

The Qualcomm investigation was the most significant abuse of dominance case of the last 12 months. In addition to abuses of SEP licensing (discussed above), the NDRC also found that Qualcomm abused its dominant position in the global markets for the supply of baseband wireless chips for the CDMA, WCDMA and LTE standards. The NDRC found Qualcomm dominant based with market shares of 93.1% for CDMA, 53.9% for WCDMA and 96% for LTE baseband chips. The NDRC found Qualcomm abusively conditioned the supply of baseband chips to terminal manufacturers on entering licenses by prohibiting any challenges to license terms.

The SAIC is reportedly investigating Microsoft and Tetra-Pak, both of which have faced past antitrust probes in other jurisdictions, but the specific practices under the current investigations have not been confirmed by the SAIC.

China's courts also impact the emerging abuse of dominance rules. The Supreme People's Court (SPC) issued its first decision under the AML on October 8 2014, upholding a March 2013 decision by the Guangdong Higher People's Court rejecting Qihoo's claims that Tencent had violated the AML rules against abuse of dominance by temporarily rendering its “QQ” instant messaging (IM) service incompatible with Qihoo's security software and by bundling new application manager software with IM software upgrades. The SPC articulated a flexible approach to abuse of dominance claims, focusing on actual market dynamics rather than market shares in gauging dominance and on the actual competitive effects rather than the form of the challenged conduct in defining abuse. But while this outcome may be welcomed by multinationals fearing future abuse of dominance claims in China, it remains to be seen how far the SPC's effects-based approach will extend to future investigations and litigation.

5. What does MOFCOM focus on during merger review and how do its practices compare with those of antitrust overseers in other jurisdictions? What types of restrictive conditions should parties expect?

MOFCOM merger analysis converges with the decisions of competition authorities in the US and Europe in most cases, but significant differences remain. MOFCOM has proven willing to intervene in horizontal mergers, where the parties' combined market shares are relatively low (frequently less than 50%), and in vertical concentrations, to prevent possible monopoly leveraging or input foreclosure lacking clear evidence of the likelihood of such effects.

MOFCOM is comfortable with elaborate behavioural remedies requiring ongoing supervision by MOFCOM (retaining jurisdiction over future anti-competitive conduct in the affected markets). In clearing Microsoft's purchase of Nokia's handset business (but not its patent portfolio), MOFCOM took the extraordinary step of imposing conditions on the post-sale conduct of the selling party (as opposed to the buyer or target) to prevent Nokia from pursuing more aggressive IP licensing practices after shedding its manufacturing business. In four cases, MOFCOM has required key commercial functions of the acquired business to be “held separately” as an independent competitor indefinitely until MOFCOM permits further integration. While some buyers may prefer the interim profits of the target and the possibility of eventual integration to the outright blocking of a deal, the “hold separate” remedies prolong uncertainty for investors and consumers and vitiate potential efficiency gains.

6. What practical advice would you give to foreign companies about to engage in an acquisition that would trigger an AML review?

MOFCOM's Anti-monopoly Bureau has developed substantial expertise over seven years of active enforcement and ongoing dialog with foreign counterparts. Nevertheless, it remains understaffed and is required to confer with other bureaus, ministries, trade associations and interested parties in the course of its decision making. Notifying parties should anticipate a lengthy review, but seek to expedite the process with clear, complete and convincing submissions. Parties should demonstrate that the transaction will both benefit Chinese consumers and suit China's broader public policy agenda. Strong antitrust defenses mitigate the risks of remedies driven by industrial policy or political considerations, and the AML explicitly allows public policy gains to offset anticompetitive harms. Careful alignment with public relations and government relations can help to address potential complaints by Chinese stakeholders.

7. What developments do you expect to see in the next 12 months and how will they change the competition landscape?

The NDRC and SAIC are likely to continue to prioritise cases involving products or industries impacting the daily lives of ordinary Chinese consumers or reinforce important public policy and industrial policy objectives. Price fixing and resale price maintenance remain “low hanging fruit” for the NDRC and SAIC. They are also likely to tackle controversial questions about the antitrust limits of IP rights. Competition authorities in Europe, the US and other jurisdictions are grappling with the standards for calculating FRAND royalties for SEPs, the availability of injunctive relief to enforce FRAND-encumbered patents and potential misconduct by patent-assertion entities. China's approach to these controversial issues may impact high-tech industries worldwide.

8. Over the past 12 months, have AML principles been applied fairly to both domestic and foreign businesses?

Multinational companies, trade associations and foreign governments have repeatedly voiced concerns that Chinese competition authorities have unfairly discriminated against foreign enterprises, while Chinese authorities have repeatedly insisted that AML enforcement is even-handed and consistent with international practice. Critics maintain that NDRC and SAIC enforcement actions against foreign companies have yielded greater penalties, and that several MOFCOM decisions with facially weak analyses have yielded substantial commercial windfalls for Chinese interests. Defenders point out that most enforcement actions against anti-competitive conduct under the AML (along with the PRC Pricing Law and PRC Anti-unfair Competition Law) have targeted domestic companies, including prominent state-owned enterprises, and that MOFCOM unconditionally clears most transactions and is rarely the only antitrust regulator to impose conditions on global deals. While industrial policy and protectionism likely colour enforcement actions against foreign companies, enforcement actions against domestic companies likely reflect similar concerns about domestic public perceptions and institutional politics. Improved transparency and procedural protections would make AML enforcement fairer for foreign and domestic parties alike and enable outsiders to evaluate the evidentiary support and analytical rigour of specific enforcement actions.


Author biography

Nate Bush
Litigation Partner

Nathan G Bush (Nate) is a partner in the antitrust & competition and white collar defence & corporate investigations practice groups of O'Melveny & Myers LLP. He practiced in Beijing from 2004 to 2012, and now covers Asia from the firm's Singapore and Beijing offices.
Nate focuses on internal investigations, regulatory and criminal investigations, compliance counselling and disputes involving antitrust, corruption and fraud. He advises clients on antitrust and compliance aspects of complex mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures and private equity and venture capital investments. He has investigated price fixing, bribery, fraud and other commercial misconduct in China, Indonesia, India, Malaysia, Japan, Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia and other jurisdictions. He has also represented clients in trade remedy proceedings and successful challenges to market access barriers before the WTO.
Nate frequently publishes and speaks on competition, corruption and trade policy in Asia, and co-authored the China chapter of the ABA treatise on Competition Laws outside the United States. He is active in the American Chambers of Commerce in China, serving as legal committee chairman in 2008 and as general counsel from 2009 to 2011.

美迈斯律师事务所的布内森律师详述了商务部、发改委及工商总局的执法行动、高通和奇虎案的经验总结及反垄断申报的要求

1. 请描述三个竞争执法机关：商务部、发改委和工商总局近期的执法行动。

中国第一部综合性竞争法——《反垄断法》于2008年8月1日生效。在2014年8月至2015年7月，即《反垄断法》执法的第七年，中国的竞争主管机关进行了各种反垄断执法行动。

发展和改革委员会（“发改委”）就违反《反垄断法》“行为规定”中有关禁止垄断协议和滥用市场支配地位相关规定的价格行为具有执法权，国家工商行政管理总局（“工商总局”）就不涉及的价格的违法行为具有执法权。

过去12月中最重大的《反垄断法》执法行动是发改委于2015年2月9日对高通在其标准必要专利许可和基带芯片供应中滥用市场支配地位作出的处罚决定，高通被处以60.88亿人民币的罚款（中国迄今最高的反垄断罚款），并做出多项救济性承诺。

发改委的其他反垄断调查针对固定价格和维持转售价格。2014年8月20日，发改委对12家日本汽车部件厂商和轴承厂商固定价格的行为处以总计12.4亿元人民币的罚款。发改委对进口汽车经销商进行了大规模的调查，对涉及宝马、克莱斯勒、大众、奥迪以及梅赛德斯—奔驰的中国经销商的维持转售价格和横向限制行为进行了罚款。发改委还对国内水泥和旅游行业的固定价格和维持转售价格行为进行了调查，并要求河北省政府纠正其对外省车辆征收更高高速公路费的政策。

工商总局在过去12月的执法决定主要是针对国内违法行为，包括地方自来水公司以及其他行政性垄断公司滥用市场支配地位的行为、地方性卡特尔和捆绑销售行为。

中华人民共和国商务部（“商务部”）对《反垄断法》项下的特定合并、收购和合营（“集中”）进行审查以确定其是否会对竞争造成危害。2014年7月至2015年6月，商务部无条件批准了276项集中。在此期间，商务部为186个“简易案件”征求公众意见。“简易案件”制度是商务部为了解决外界对审批期限过长的意见，于2014年开始执行的“简易案件”政策。根据“简易案件”政策，被视为不太可能影响中国消费者或市场的某些类型的案件可适用简易申报要求，但需经10天的公示。公开信息显示绝大部分简易案件审批完成从立案到批准历时约30天，大大短于其他案件。

在过去12月中，商务部并未禁止任何交易，也未对任何交易附加条件。但在应用材料和毅力科创于2015年4月26日宣布其因美国司法部否决了其救济措施方案而放弃拟议合并之后，商务部于2015年4月30日宣布其也已告知交易双方合并交易将“严重”影响中国消费者的利益，并宣布交易双方提出的救济措施“没有解决商务部以及其他相关司法辖区的竞争关注”，交易双方宣布放弃合并计划。

2. 过去12月中在立法方面影响竞争法机制的最主要的变化是什么以及它们如何影响竞争法机制？

2015年4月7日，工商总局正式通过了《关于禁止滥用知识产权排除、限制竞争行为的规定》，就工商总局对涉及知识产权的垄断协议和滥用市场支配地位案件的做法进行了规定。这一规定将大多数涉及知识产权的反垄断违法行为定义为“排除、限制竞争”的行为，说明执法中需要看相关行为的实际影响，而非采用“本身违法”原则。被禁止的行为包括：不合理的限定交易、歧视、专利的搭售、拒绝许可、要求独占性回授、禁止对知识产权的有效性提出质疑、对过期专利收取专利费、不当利用专利联营、滥用标准必要专利（包括专利伏击和专利挟持）以及比较具有争议的没有正当理由拒绝许可构成“必需设施”的专利。该规定还基于各方的市场份额和替代技术的可获得性设定了某些涉及知识产权的横向和纵向协议的推定安全港。

2015年6月有报道称发改委在国务院反垄断委员会的支持下，正牵头其他部门起草新的适用于发改委和工商总局的指南。新的指南将对“宽大”、中止调查、处罚以及《反垄断法》第15条项下的垄断协议豁免的适用原则给出指导。此外，新的滥用知识产权规定将由国务院反垄断委员会发布。反垄断委员会的规定与工商总局的规定会有什么不同，我们拭目以待。

2014年12月4日，商务部发布了《关于经营者集中附加限制性条件的规定（试行）》，将商务部在结构性、行为性以及综合性救济措施的提议、采纳、监督以及变更方面的实践形成规定。

3. 高通案件有关许可的经验教训是什么？

发改委就高通作出的处罚决定对标准必要专利许可人非常有指导意义。

如果不使用标准必要专利，相关无线技术标准将无法被实施，因此每一标准必要专利被定义为一个单独的产品市场。高通因此被认定在其每一标准必要专利的各自市场具有市场支配地位。发改委认定高通在许可标准必要专利时“间接”收取不公平的高价，滥用了其市场支配地位。（“间接”价格影响的认定表面上使案件落入了发改委在《反垄断法》项下对涉及价格的违法行为的执法权限内。）

高通的许可项目将高通很多专利捆绑起来，包括目前有效的专利与过期专利以及对某一标准可能并非必要的专利。发改委认定这一做法属于滥用行为，因为其将标准必要专利与非标准必要专利捆绑，对过期专利收取专利费，不区分标准必要专利和非标准必要专利。高通的许可项目还要求被许可人将自己的相关专利向其他被许可人进行反向许可，并承诺不对高通或其他被许可人主张权利。尽管高通辩称这是为保护基带芯片供应商以及被许可人免受专利侵权主张的困扰，属于专利许可价值的不可分割部分，发改委认定该做法未尊重被许可人自己的专利的价值，属于滥用行为。发改委还认定高通按无线通信终端的整机批发净售价的100%作为计算专利许可费的基础，其中包括高通专利不涵盖的功能的价值，属于滥用市场支配地位行为。

发改委有关该案结果的公告以及处罚决定的公开版本显示高通承诺修改其对中国被许可人的许可项目，停止上述做法。高通还承诺以整机批发净售价的65%（而非100%）作为计算在中国销售的无线通信终端的专利费计算基础。但发改委的处罚决定未说明65%的依据，或采用在“公平、合理、非歧视”许可原则下通常建议的“最小可售单元”标准。

4. 有哪些最重要的滥用市场支配地位案件？如何界定？

高通案是过去12个月最重大的滥用市场支配地位案件。除了在许可标准必要专利中的滥用行为（见上文），发改委还认定高通在全球使用CDMA, WCDMA, 和LTE标准的基带芯片市场滥用其市场支配地位。发改委根据高通在CDMA基带芯片市场上93.1%的份额，在WCDMA基带芯片市场上53.9%的份额以及LTE基带芯片市场上96%的份额，认定高通具有市场支配地位。发改委认定高通以通讯终端厂商就专利许可协议产生争议不得提起诉讼作为向其供应基带芯片的条件，滥用了市场支配地位。

据报道，工商总局在对微软和利乐进行调查，这两家公司都曾在其他司法辖区被进行过反垄断调查，但工商总局并未披露这两家公司被调查的具体行为。

中国法院同样也影响着正在形成中的滥用市场支配地位规则。最高人民法院（最高院）于2014年10月8日作出了其在
《反垄断法》项下的第一个判决，维持广东省高级人民法院2013年3月作出的判决，驳回了奇虎有关腾讯临时使其QQ即时通讯服务与奇虎的安全软件不兼容以及将新的应用管理软件与即时通讯软件更新相捆绑的做法违反《反垄断法》，滥用了市场支配地位的主张。最高院就滥用市场支配地位的主张采取了灵活的做法，在认定市场支配地位时侧重市场实际动态变化，而非市场份额，在认定滥用时侧重实际竞争影响而非相关行为的形式。尽管该判决受到了担心在中国被诉滥用市场支配地位的跨国公司的欢迎，最高院这一侧重行为影响的做法在多大程度中会在未来的调查和诉讼中得以延续，我们拭目以待。

5. 商务部在并购审查中的侧重点是什么，与其它司法辖区的竞争主管机关有何不同？商务部会附加什么样的限制性条件？

商务部的并购审查分析在大多数案件中与美国和欧盟竞争主管机关的决定大体一致，但仍存在很大不同。相比较，商务部会对交易各方合计市场份额比较低（通常低于50%）的横向合并交易进行干预，在纵向交易中会对缺乏证明交易可能导致垄断传导效应或上游封锁效应的证据的案件进行干预。商务部比较习惯采用行为性救济措施，行为性救济措施要求商务部进行持续监督（保持对相关市场上未来反竞争行为的管辖权）。在批准微软收购诺基亚手机业务（不包括专利组合）的交易中，商务部采取了不寻常的做法，对出售方（非买方或目标业务）的交易后行为附加了条件，以防止诺基亚在出售了其手机生产业务之后采取高压的知识产权许可做法。商务部在4个案件中要求被收购业务的主要商务功能被保持独立，作为一家独立的竞争者，直至商务部允许进一步融合。较之交易被否，有些买方可能更倾向于获得收购目标的暂时利润和最终将融合的可能性，但“保持独立”这一救济措施给投资者和消费者带来了被延长了的不确定性，损害了潜在的效率收益。

6. 对于要进行可能引发反垄断申报的交易的外国公司，您有什么实用建议吗？

在过去七年的执法行动以及同外国执法机构的持续的对话中，商务部反垄断局已经积累了大量的审查经验。尽管如此，反垄断局仍处于人手不足的状态，而且其在决策过程中必须征求其它司局、部委、行业协会以及利益相关方的意见。申报人应当做好审查期较长的心理预期，但应尽力提供清晰、完整以及具有说服力的申报文件以便让该程序尽快完成。各方应当证明该交易将会既让中国消费者受益，又符合中国整体公共政策。强有力的反垄断辩护能够降低由于行业政策和政治考虑而被附加救济措施的可能性，而且《反垄断法》明确允许公共政策利益抵消反竞争危害考虑。审慎地同公共关系以及政府关系部分协调，能够有助于解决国内利益相关方可能有的反对意见。

7. 未来12个月的期间内会有怎样的发展以及这些发展将对竞争执法格局产生哪些影响？

发改委和工商总局可能会继续优先处理涉及对普通中国消费者日常生活具有影响的产品或产业的案件，或者是促进重要的公共政策和行业政策目标的案件。固定价格以及维持转售价格对于两家执法机关来说属于“最容易得手”的执法对象。两家执法机关也很可能会着手处理在有关知识产权的反垄断限制方面具有争议的相关问题。欧洲、美国以及其它法域的竞争执法机关正在努力研究“公平、合理、非歧视”原则下标准必要专利的许可费计算的标准、实施负有“公平、合理、非歧视”义务的专利的禁令救济的可能性以及专利主张方可能进行的不当行为等问题。中国在这些争议问题上的做法将可能对全球的高科技产业产生影响。

8. 《反垄断法》的原则在过去的12个月期间是否被公平地适用于国内企业和外国企业？

跨国企业、行业协会和外国政府机构已经反复地重申了他们对于中国竞争执法机关不公平地歧视外国企业的担忧，而中国主管机构也反复坚持《反垄断法》的执行是公平的也是符合国际惯例的。仍有批评认为发改委和工商总局针对外国企业的执法行动导致了高罚金，而商务部的某些看似缺乏分析依据的决定给中国利益相关方带来了大量的商业横财。而辩护者则指出大多数《反垄断法》项下的执法行动均针对的是国内企业，包括大型国有企业，而且商务部无条件批准了绝大多数的集中交易，也不是唯一对全球交易附条件的反垄断执法机关。行业政策和保护主义可能影响对外国公司的执法行动，针对国内企业的执法行动则可能反映出国内公众看法和部门政治考虑的类似影响。提高透明度和程序保护，能够让反垄断执法对外国企业和国内企业都更加公平，而且让外界人士能够评估具体执法行动的证据支持以及分析严谨度。


作者简历

布内森
诉讼业务合伙人

布内森是美迈斯律师事务所新加坡代表处诉讼部合伙人。在2012年调任新加坡代表处以及2004年前往北京就任之前，他曾常驻美迈斯华盛顿代表处。
内森的执业重点是监管事务、商事争议以及涉及反垄断和竞争、贪污腐败及国际贸易方面的诉讼。内森针对中国和亚洲其他国家竞争体制下的并购申报、合规战略及执法风险向客户建言献策。他还定期就资本市场、并购、私募股权投资和亚洲的风险投资交易之合规问题提供建议。内森对日本、中国、香港、新加坡、印度、越南及其它欧洲及南美州国家的多个领域进行过的内部调查达30起。内森就中国加入世界贸易组织承诺和世界贸易组织争端解决程序等问题代表跨国公司同美国和中国政府进行磋商。
他经常就亚洲的竞争和贸易政策发表文章及演讲，并撰写了美国律师协会的《美国境外的竞争法》条约的中国部分。他一直是美国商会在中国的活跃人物，于2008年担任美国商会法律委员会联席主席，在2009至2011年间担任其总法律顾问。