In particular, Chinese investors have shown an unprecedented interest in owning German-based businesses. This is mainly in the traditional automotive and machinery industries, resulting in some quite prominent and successful takeovers. But the challenges for Asian and especially Chinese participants in auction sales can prove rather intense.

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Share deal versus asset deal

When investing in German companies, investors can choose to buy shares in a certain target company or its assets. Typically, share deals are seen more often. This is because asset deals are more complicated, as any asset to be transferred must be specified in the agreement. In addition, the transfer of ongoing commercial agreements with suppliers and customers from the seller to the purchaser usually requires consent of the other contractual party. This can sometimes lead to the contractual party trying to renegotiate the terms and conditions of the concerned agreement. From a seller's perspective, a share deal is generally favourable from a tax perspective.

Situations may occur though where it is better to buy assets, for example, if the target company has filed for insolvency or if the purchaser only wants to buy a certain business unit by way of spin-off. An asset deal may also be advantageous for the purchaser from a tax perspective due to a possible step-up.

If the transaction is structured as an asset deal, the employees of the business unit concerned are automatically transferred to the purchaser by operation of law. However, each employee is allowed to object to the transfer.

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Sale and purchase agreements

Commercial agreements under German law are substantially shorter than Anglo-Saxon-type agreements. This is because a large degree of the parties' legal relations can be based on existing statutory German law, by which the relevant Codes provide adequate solutions for many situations that typically occur.

For the most part, this also applies to sale and purchase agreements (SPA) in the acquisition of shares, although in recent years the influence of Anglo-Saxon legal culture has been considerable. However, comparatively short German-style documents continue to prevail in many equity-financed transactions and in transactions involving medium-sized German companies.

These short German SPAs are possible since many key areas of corporate and contract law are already covered by comprehensive statutory laws. On issues like remedies for violation of warranties and the calculation of damages caused by contributory negligence and delay, in general it is possible to rely on statutory law. Consequently, the wording of the contracts sometimes gives little guidance on practical handling issues since it is to be understood within the context of statutory law and general legal principles.

The universal structure of German law SPAs is similar to standards used elsewhere. Core elements of the SPA are, as in many other jurisdictions, the purchase price and respective adjustment procedures. Since the subprime difficulties in 2007, net financial debt and working capital adjustments as of the closing date, have again become more frequent. So-called locked box mechanisms or agreements that provide for a fixed purchase price that is determined based on past figures and not subject to adjustments are still used. A second major part of an SPA concerns representations and warranties, which are comparable to those in other jurisdictions.

A major deviation from Anglo-Saxon SPAs is the distinction between the sale and the transfer of shares (or assets), which are described as two separate transactions. The sale constitutes only the obligation to transfer the share while the transfer constitutes the actual transfer of ownership (in rem). The transfer is usually subject to the closing conditions, like antitrust clearance and payment of the purchase price.

Another German peculiarity is that any German law agreement involving the transfer of private limited liability shares or real property must be notarised. This means that the SPA itself and any ancillary agreement and all annexes (other than lists and tables to which an exception applies) must be read aloud by or in front of a notary. German notary fees are governed by a mandatory non-negotiable fee schedule and are calculated on the basis of the transaction value. They range from €10 to an approximate maximum of €55,000. The maximum usually applies to a transaction value of €60 million or more. These fees are customarily borne by the purchaser.

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Types of business organisation

Private limited liability company (GmbH)

The form of a GmbH is the most frequently used corporation form in Germany. The foundation of a GmbH, as well as the transfer of shares, requires notarisation by a public notary. Provided that the nominal share capital is fully paid in after the foundation of a GmbH and is not repaid, the shareholders of a GmbH are in general not personally liable for the company's debts. The German Limited Liability Company Act provides for capital maintenance rules pursuant to which it is generally prohibited to repay the nominal share capital to shareholders.

The corporate bodies of a GmbH consist of the management and the shareholder assembly. Under German law, the managing directors may be appointed and removed relatively easily by the shareholders at any time they wish. In addition, to the two mandatory bodies, the shareholders of a GmbH can opt to implement an advisory board or a supervisory board. If a certain number of employees are exceeded (500), mandatory labour law requires setting up a supervisory board. The occupation and competences of the supervisory board depend on the number of employees (500/2000).

Stock corporation (AG)

In addition to the GmbH, the second major type of German corporate entity is the AG. The shares in an AG may be, but do not have to be, publicly listed. In fact, most of the German AGs are not listed but are privately held by a smaller number of shareholders, like a large family.

The legal regime that applies to an AG is considerably stricter than to a GmbH. As a rule of thumb, the articles of association of an AG may only contain provisions that deviate from those contained in the German Stock Corporation Act, if this is expressly permitted. In contrast, the articles of association of a GmbH may contain any provision, unless such provision is prohibited under the German Limited Liability Company Act. This means the flexibility in structuring an AG is quite limited – in particular with respect to its corporate governance.

The three mandatory corporate bodies of an AG are the management board, the supervisory board and the shareholders' meeting. A major difference to a GmbH is that the management board is not subject to instructions from the shareholders' meeting or the supervisory board. However, certain restrictions on the powers of representation (internally in relation to the company) may be imposed, for example, the rules of procedure of the management board.

The members of the supervisory board are elected by the shareholders' meeting unless employee representatives are required by mandatory law (depending on the number of employees).

The minimum stated share capital of an AG amounts to €50,000, whereby the minimum nominal amount per share is €1. In contrast to the law governing the GmbH, the sale and transfer of shares in an AG does not require a specific form, hence notarisation is also not required. However, according to the articles of association, the transfer of registered shares, as opposed to bearer shares, may be subject to the consent of the AG.

Any actions with respect to the shares in a listed AG must comply with insider law, the violation of which regularly constitutes a criminal offence.

Partnerships

Different types of partnerships can be seen in Germany, with the limited partnership most common, in particular a GmbH as general partner, so-called GmbH & Co. KG.

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Regulatory framework

Foreign investment approvals

In addition to antitrust law, if applicable, the acquisition of companies with offices or places of business in Germany by investors with their seats or management outside the EU or European Free Trade Area is partly restricted.

Since 2009, each direct or indirect acquisition of at least 25% of the voting rights of a German company by an acquirer may in theory be reviewed by the German Ministry of Economics (GMoE). The Ministry will review the transaction within three months from signing, publication of the decision to make a takeover bid, or the publication that control was obtained. If the GMoE requests the delivery of documents relating to the acquisition, it has an additional two months to issue orders or prohibit the acquisition in case it endangers the public order or security of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In case of the acquisition of a German company that manufactures or develops military weapons, cryptographic systems or other defence-related goods, the transaction must be announced to the GMoE as well.

Since generally, the investment climate in Germany continues to be very friendly to foreign investment and the regulation is mainly targeted to the very few businesses relevant to national security, it has in practice never proven to be an obstacle in the vast majority of transactions which will not be subject to any review.

Public financial control

When acquiring publicly traded shares in German companies, investors are subject to various regulatory requirements under German takeover laws.

When acquiring or selling shares in companies admitted for trading on a regulated market and in so doing exceeding or falling below certain thresholds in voting rights (namely 3%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 50% or 75%) any investor must notify the company and the German financial supervisory authority (Bundesanstalt für Dienstleistungsaufsicht or BaFin) without undue delay and at the latest, within four trading days. A similar obligation also applies to warrants or financial instruments that give an unconditional right to acquire shares in such companies. Voting rights may generally not be exercised if the notification requirement has not been complied with. The suspension may last for six months if the notification was omitted due to gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

Any purchaser of listed shares up to or exceeding the threshold of 10% must disclose the objective of the purchase and the source of financing to the issuer within 20 trading days. Public tender offers are exempt from this disclosure, as well as purchases by investment companies regulated under the UCITS directive. The issuer is then required to publish such disclosed information to the public.

When acquiring shares in AGs not listed on a regulated market and which exceed a threshold of more than 25% of the registered share capital, the purchaser must notify the company and the company has to publish this notification.

No similar notification requirements apply to purchases of shares or interest in companies of other legal types like GmbHs.

Tender offer

If shares in the relevant company are admitted for trading on a regulated market, public tender offers can be made by way of two main types of offers, namely voluntary offers and mandatory offers. Voluntary offers aimed at the acquisition of control over a company are called takeover offers. As opposed to a mandatory offer which must be made to all outside shareholders upon the acquisition of control in any way, other than by a takeover bid. For example, control can be gained through an off-market purchase of shares (block sale), purchases from the stock exchange, subscription in a capital increase, or a merger.

Control is established by directly or indirectly holding 30% or more of the voting rights in the target AG. To determine whether the 30% threshold has been met, the voting rights directly held by a shareholder and certain voting rights imputed to it must be combined. For example, voting rights that are owned by a subsidiary, or by a third party for the account of the shareholder, shall be deemed as voting rights of the relevant shareholder. In particular, the voting rights of a third party with whom a shareholder coordinates its conduct with respect to the AG are imputed to the shareholder (acting in concert). Coordination between the shareholder and a third party shall be deemed to exist in cases in which they agree on the exercise of voting rights or otherwise act together with the purpose of affecting permanent and significant changes to the company's business approach.

Once the bidder has decided to make a takeover offer or once the 30% control threshold has been met, the bidder must immediately publish the decision or announce that the control threshold has been met. As a rule, the bidder then has a period of four weeks to prepare an offer document containing the full terms of the offer and to submit the document to BaFin for verification. Upon approval of the document by BaFin, the bidder must immediately publish the offer. The acceptance period that starts with the publication may not generally be less than four weeks and not more than 10 weeks. In certain cases, the acceptance period extends by operation of law.

For both voluntary and mandatory offers, the consideration to be offered to all other shareholders must at least be equal to the higher of:

• the highest consideration that the bidder (or certain persons related to or acting together with) has granted or promised to pay for the acquisition of shares, during a period of six months preceding publication of the offer document; or

• the weighted average domestic stock market prices of the shares during the three month period preceding publication of the bidder's decision to make a takeover offer or of the bidder's attainment of the 30% threshold.

The consideration may be adjusted to a higher price if the bidder (or certain persons related to or acting together with) acquires further shares. This can either be during the acceptance period or, by way of an off-market transaction, within one year after the lapse of the acceptance period and for a consideration exceeding the value of the consideration specified in the offer. An exception exists for the acquisition of shares in connection with a statutory obligation to grant compensation to shareholders of the target company.

Takeover offers and mandatory offers basically follow the same legal regime. An important deviation, however, is that a mandatory offer may not be made subject to conditions precedent, whereas for voluntary offers, conditions precedent are generally permissible. In practice, voluntary offers may sometimes be subject to the achievement of certain acceptance thresholds in order to ensure that a certain percentage of voting rights is obtained.

Based on the fact that a mandatory offer cannot be made subject to conditions precedent, an attempt is often made and it is possible, to structure the transaction in order to have a voluntary offer rather than a mandatory offer. This may be achieved by a combination of a private transaction comprising 30% or more of the voting rights together with a voluntary offer.

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Private M&A procedures

The private acquisition of a company or its business is generally not subject to regulations in respect of the procedure or the conditions. Individual contractual freedom applies here, within the general limits of public policy and fair dealing.

Many businesses are being sold by way of an auction process, typically organised by one of the domestic or international investment banks or M&A advisory firms. In order to create a high level of competition and transaction security for the seller, these auction processes follow a relatively strict schedule of different stages of due diligence and initial and confirmatory offers. Time is of the essence and a bidder may be taken out of the process simply because the next mandatory offer is not delivered on time.

For bidders from countries like China, providing for a strict system of governmental approvals for foreign investment or currency exports, it has sometimes proven quite difficult to obtain the respective consents and documentation within the strict timeframe provided by the auction procedure. Since many European sellers do consider such governmental approvals a serious threat to the successful completion of a sale to a Chinese investor, it is advisable to have a comprehensive overview of all such approval requirements, a clear path on how to work through the respective requirements and to show a high level of transparency to the sellers. This helps them understand what results can reasonably be expected in a certain timeframe. Many successful Chinese investments in Germany have already helped establish an understanding for these specific items and are proof that all such governmental requirements can be dealt with in a satisfactory manner.

Author biographies

Jens Hörmann

Partner

Jens is a partner with P+P in Munich and specialises in M&A and private equity. In particular, he focuses on private equity transactions, joint ventures as well as capital markets law. Jens studied law in Konstanz, Germany.

Otto Haberstock

Partner

Otto is a partner with P+P in Munich. He focuses on M&A, private equity and venture capital transactions, as well as general corporate law and has advised private equity funds, corporations, entrepreneurs and management teams on many buy-out, investment, IPO or similar transactions. He is admitted to the bars in Munich and New York.

德国并购交易概要

Jens Hörmann 和 Otto Haberstock

P+P Pöllath + Partners

德国是欧洲最大的经济体，世界主要的商品出口国之一，出口占国民产出超过三分之一。规范德国经济的法律制度采用成文法而不是案例法，法律确定性水平高，从而效率高，成本低，可推断性强。世界经济论坛的2012-2013年度全球竞争力报告在法律制度的效率这一个项目上给予德国最高排名。

自2008年和2009年金融危机以来，外国投资已达到高峰。这是因为德国企业即使在欧元危机期间依然表现出强大的韧力。由于德国大多数企业都属私营，有时还是创立者或其家族拥有，这些企业的出售引发经营者竭力寻找最佳的继任人。

中国投资者对拥有德国企业，特别是传统的汽车和机械工业，尤其表现出前所未有的兴趣，促成了一些颇为引人注目的成功收购。但是，对于亚洲参与者，尤其是中国参与者，拍卖销售中的挑战可以是相当激烈。

股份交易与资产交易的比较

投资者向德国公司投资，可选择购买目标公司的股份或资产。一般而言，股份交易较为常见。由于任何资产的转让都必须通过协议规定，因而资产交易比较复杂。此外，卖方向买方转让与供应商和客户正在执行中的商业协议，一般需要有关合约方的同意。这有时会导致有关合约方试图重新谈判有关协议的条款。从卖方角度看来，股份交易在税务上通常比较有利。

有时也会出现购买资产比较有利的情况。例如，如果目标公司已申请破产，或者买方只想通过分拆的手段来购买其某个业务部门。在税务上，由于有可能提高资产计税基础，资产交易可能也对买方有利。

如果交易以资产交易形式进行，根据法律规定，有关企业单位的员工自动转为买方的员工。不过，每个员工都可反对被转移。

买卖协议

德国法律下的商业协议比盎格鲁-萨克森式协议要大为简短。这是因为协议各方的法律关系在很大程度上能够以现行的德国成文法为依据，而其中有关的法典对通常出现的很多情况已作出足够的解决规定。

尽管近几年盎格鲁-萨克森法律文化的影响相当大，在很大程度上，简短的形式也适用于股份收购交易中的买卖协议（SPA）。不过，在很多股权融资交易和涉及中型德国公司的交易中，相对简短的德国式文件继续占主流。

德国式买卖协议之所以简短，是由于完备的成文法已涵盖公司法和合同法的很多关键领域。在违反保证的救济和有过失疏忽及延误所致损害赔偿的计算这类问题上，一般可以依赖成文法。因此，合同文字有时在实际处理问题时没有多大指导作用，因为这些文字需要在成文法和一般法律原则的语境里理解。

德国法买卖协议的通用结构与其他地方采用的标准类似。在很多其他司法管辖地，买卖协议的核心成分是买价和有关的调整程序。自2007年次贷危机以来，成交日之前对净财务债务和流动资金的调整再次变得更为频繁。根据以往数字锁定买价不再调整的所谓“上锁盒子”机制或协议仍然在使用。买卖协议的另一主要部分涉及陈述和保证，这个部分与其他司法管辖地的类似。

与盎格鲁-萨克森式买卖协议的一个主要不同之处是对股票

（或资产）出售与转让的区别，将两者视作不同的交易。出售仅构成转让股份的义务，而转让构成所有权的实际转移（对物）。转让一般有成交条件，例如通过反垄断审查和支付买价。

德国的另一独特之处是，凡涉及私营有限公司股份或房地产转让的德国法协议都必须经过公证。也就是说，买卖协议本身以及任何附加协议和附件（除清单和表格属于例外）都必须由公证人或在公证人面前大声宣读一次。德国的公证费有不可商议的法定收费标准，按交易价值计算，收费从10欧元至大约最高55,000欧元。最高收费一般适用于价值6千万欧元或以上的交易。公证费习惯上由买方承担。

商业组织形式

私营有限责任公司（GmbH）

私营有限责任公司是在德国最常用的公司形式。私营有限责任公司的成立以及股份转让都需要经过公证。如果名义股本在公司成立之后已全额支付且没有偿还，则公司的股东一般不对公司债务承担个人责任。德国的《私营有限责任公司法》规定了资本维护规则，根据该规则，名义股本一般是禁止偿还予股东的。

私营有限责任公司的公司架构由管理层和股东大会组成。根据德国法律，股东可随时相对容易地任免执行董事。除了两个法定的机构以外，私营有限责任公司的股东可选择成立咨询委员会或监事会。如果公司员工超过一定人数（500），劳动法强制要求设立监事会。监事会的席位组成和权力取决于员工人数（500/2000）。

股份公司（AG）

除有限责任公司外，德国另一种主要的公司形式是股份公司。股份公司的股份可以上市，但不是必须上市。实际上，大多数德国股份公司是不上市的，而由例如大家族那样的少数股东私人拥有。

适用于股份公司的法律制度比适用于私营有限责任公司的法律制度严格得多。作为一条经验法则，股份公司的章程只可在明确许可的情况下，才能够载入偏离德国《股份公司法》规定的条款。与此相反，有限责任公司的章程可包含任何条款，除非该条款是德国《有限责任公司法》禁止的。这表明，建构股份公司的灵活性非常有限，特别是在公司治理方面。

股份公司的三个法定机构是管理委员会、监事会和股东大会。与有限责任公司的一个重大不同是管理委员会不必听命于股东大会或监事会。但是，可以对其代表权（在内部有关公司的事务）设定某些限制，例如管理委员会的议事规则。

监事会成员由股东大会选举产生，除非法律强制要求选派员工代表（取决于员工人数）。

股份公司的最低股本为5万欧元，每股最低面值1欧元。与规范有限责任公司的法律相反，股份公司的股份出售和转让不需要特别的形式，因而也不需要公证。然而，与不记名股份不同，根据公司章程，注册股份的转让可能需经股份公司的同意。

有关上市股份公司股份的任何行为都必须遵守内幕交易法，违反该法律通常构成刑事犯罪。

合伙公司

在德国可以看到不同形式的合伙公司，最常见的是有限责任合伙公司，特别是以一个有限责任公司作为普通合伙人的合伙公司，即所谓私营有限责任公司有限合伙公司（GmbH & Co. KG）。

监管制度

外国投资审批

除了反垄断法以外，如果公司所在地或管理地在欧盟或欧洲自由贸易区以外的投资者要收购办公场所或经营地在德国的公司，可能适用部分限制。

自2009年以来，收购者直接或间接收购德国公司至少25%投票权的每笔交易，理论上都要经德国经济部（GMoE）审查。GMoE在交易签订、发布收购决定或发布取得控制权之日后三个月内审查交易。如果GMoE要求提交有关的收购文件，它还有额外两个月来发布命令，或在交易会危及德国联邦共和国的公共秩序或安全的情况下禁止交易。

如果收购制造或开发军用武器、加密系统或其他国防有关产品的德国公司，交易也必须向GMoE声明。

由于德国的投资环境对外国投资依然非常友好，监管制度主要针对涉及国家安全的少数个别行业，因此，在无需任何审查的绝大多数交易中，实际上从来没有造成障碍。

公共财政控制

投资者在收购德国上市公司股份时，须符合德国收购法律的各种监管要求。

任何投资者收购或出售获准在受监管市场交易的公司股份，而且交易导致其投票权超过或低于某一特定比例界线（即3%、5%、10%、15%、20%、25%、30%、50%或70%），投资者必须通知公司和德国金融监管部门（金融监管委员会，简称BaFin），不得无故拖延，而且最迟不得超过4个交易日内通知。类似的义务也适用于认股证或赋予投资者无条件权利购买上市公司股票的金融工具。如果投资者未能遵行上述通知要求，一般不能行使投票权。因严重疏忽或有意行为不当而不作出通知的，可被暂停行使权利达六个月。

购买上市股票达到或超过10%界线的任何购买者必须在20个交易日内向发行人披露购股目的和资金来源。公开要约收购及受UCITS指令监管的投资公司进行的收购可免于作出此披露。发行人则须向公众发布上述披露信息。

购买股份公司非上市股份时，如果超过注册股本25%界线的，购买者必须通知公司，而公司必须公布该通知。

购买其他法律形式的公司的股份或股权，例如私营有限责任公司，并没有类似通知要求。

要约

如果有关公司的股票获准在受监管市场买卖，公开要约可以采用的方式主要有两种，即自愿要约和强制要约。旨在取得公司控制权的自愿要约称为“收购要约”。与此相反，如果以非收购要约方式取得控制权，例如，通过场外交易购买股份（大宗买卖）、在交易所购股、认购增资或兼并取得控制权，这时就必须向所有外部股东提出强制要约。

控制权是通过直接或间接持有目标股份公司的30%或更多投票权而实现的。在确定是否达到30%这个界线时，股东直接持有的投票权与归属于它的某些投票权必须合并计算。例如，由某个子公司或第三方为该股东持有的投票权应视为该股东的投票权。特别是在有关股份公司事宜上与该股东协调行动的第三方，其所持的投票权亦归属于该（一致行动的）股东。如果股东与第三方对投票权的行使有约定，或为了对公司的经营方法作出永久和重大改变而共同行动，则它们之间可视为存在协调。

一旦要约人已决定提出收购要约，或已达到30%控制权界线，要约人必须立即发布其决定或宣布已达到控制权界线。按规定，要约人随后有四个星期的时间准备一份包含要约全部条款的文件，并将该文件提交BaFin核查。文件获得BaFin批准后，要约人必须立即公布要约。随之开始的接受期一般不得少于四个星期，但不得长于十个星期。在某些情况下，接受期会因法律规定而延长。

无论是自愿要约还是强制要约，向所有其他股东提出的对价必须至少等于下述两者之中的较高者：

• 要约人（或其关联人或一致行动人）在公布要约文件之前六个月期间为收购股份而曾经支付或承诺支付的最高对价；

• 有关股份在要约人公布其收购要约决定或达到30%控制权界线之前三个月期间的国内股市加权平均市价。

如果要约人（或其关联人或一致行动人）在接受期期间购买了更多有关股份，或在接受期之后的一年期间通过场外交易购买了更多有关股份，而且支付的对价超过了要约中规定的价格，则对价可上调至更高价格。出于法律义务为赔偿目标公司股东而进行的股份购买属于例外。

收购要约和强制要约基本上都须遵守同样的法律规定。一个重要的不同点是，强制要约不得设置先决条件，而自愿要约则一般可以设置先决条件。在实践上，自愿要约有时以达到某个接受界线为条件，以确保能够取得一定比例的投票权。

由于强制要约不得设置先决条件，要约人往往会试图并且实际能做到将交易设定为自愿要约而不是强制要约。通过将一项涉及30%以上投票权的非公开交易与自愿要约组合，便可以做到。

非公开并购程序

非公开收购一家公司或其业务一般不受程序或条件方面的监管。在公共政策和公平交易的一般限制下，可享有个人缔约自由。

很多企业是通过拍卖程序出售的，这种拍卖程序一般由国内或国际投资银行或兼并顾问公司组织。为卖方缔造高水平的竞争和交易安全，这种拍卖程序遵循一套相对严格的、分阶段进行尽职调查、初步要约和确认要约的进程表。时间是关键要素，投标人可因为未按时提交下一个强制要约而被排除在拍卖程序以外。

对于来自中国这些国家的投标者而言，由于对外投资或货币汇出的政府审批制度严格，要在拍卖程序严格规定的时间框架内取得有关的许可和文件有时会非常困难。因为很多欧洲买方的确认为此类政府审批是对与中国投资者成功完成销售交易构成了严重威胁，所以，最好要全面考虑到所有此类审批要求，要对如何通过此类审批有一个清晰的路线图，要对卖方展现出高度的透明度。这有助于他们理解在一定的时间框架内可合理预期取得些什么结果。中国很多在德国的成功投资项目已经促进了对这些具体问题的谅解，并证明所有此类政府要意的处理。

作者简历

JENS HÖRMANN

合伙人

Jens是P+P慕尼黑办事处的合伙人，业务专长是并购和私募股权交易。他尤其专注于私募股权交易、合资交易及资本市场法律。Jens是在德国康斯坦茨学习法律的。

OTTO HABERSTOCK

合伙人

Otto是P+P慕尼黑办事处的合伙人。他专注于并购、私募股权、风险投资交易及一般公司法律，曾在很多管理层收购、投资、股票上市或类似交易中担任私募基金、公司、企业家和管理层的法律顾问。他是慕尼黑和纽约的注册律师。