While foreign investments by SOEs are closely scrutinised, concerns regarding foreign investment have not been limited to SOEs. The Canadian government's preliminary decision to deny Anglo-Australian miner BHP Billiton's proposed acquisition of Canada's Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan in 2010 generated significant controversy (BHP Billiton ultimately dropped its bid for the Canadian company) and demonstrated that the government will not hesitate to turn down transactions that it does not consider to be of net benefit to Canada.

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Closer economic ties

The current Canadian government is highly interested in increasing economic ties with China and expanding foreign investment in Canada. In February 2012, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao signed a series of joint initiatives, including agreements to cooperate on energy, natural resources, technology, innovation and agriculture. They also concluded 18 years of negotiations toward a definitive China-Canada Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA), which was signed by Canada's Minister of International Trade and Minister for the Asia-Pacific Gateway, Ed Fast, and China's Minister of Commerce, Chen Deming, on September 8 2012. The FIPA is designed to confer greater protection to foreign investors against discriminatory treatment and serves to enhance predictability of the policy framework affecting foreign investors and their investments. It was tabled in the Canadian Parliament on September 26 2012 and is now awaiting ratification.

In addition, on August 15 2012, Canada and China announced the release of a joint Economic Complementarities Study, highlighting potential bilateral economic complementarities and prospects for growth. The study examines seven economic sectors (including natural resources, machinery and equipment, transportation, infrastructure, aerospace, clean technology and environmental goods and services) and reports that its completion facilitates forming the foundation of exploratory discussions to deepen Canadian-Chinese trade and economic relations. It concludes that: “Canadian and Chinese governments should continue to deepen and strengthen our bilateral trade and investment ties through appropriate bilateral instruments to ensure that Chinese and Canadian citizens can continue to build a prosperous and sustainable future.”

Also, on November 11 2012, the Canadian government signed a long-awaited double tax treaty with Hong Kong, which should facilitate trade and investment, particularly from Hong Kong into Canada. The treaty also may present new opportunities for structuring some investments by Chinese enterprises into Canada.

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Foreign investment under the ICA

The Investment Canada Act (ICA) is a federal statute of broad application regulating the establishment and acquisitions of control of “Canadian businesses” by non-Canadians. Except with respect to cultural businesses, the Investment Review Division of Industry Canada (Investment Canada) administers the ICA under the direction of the Minister of Industry. Transactions involving business activities relating to Canada's cultural heritage or national identity, such as publishing, film, video, music and broadcasting, are administered by the Cultural Sector Investment Review of the Department of Canadian Heritage (Canadian Heritage) under the direction of the Minister of Canadian Heritage. An investment subject to the ICA will be either reviewable, in which case it is subject to both a reporting obligation and a pre-closing approval process, or else it will be notifiable, in which case it is subject to only a post-closing reporting obligation. All investments by non-Canadian investors involving Canadian entities, whether reviewable or notifiable, and even those that are neither reviewable nor notifiable, are subject to the possibility of a national security review. The rules relating to acquisition of “control” and whether an investor is a “Canadian” are complex and comprehensive.

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Statutory framework

Generally speaking, for a transaction to be reviewable a non-Canadian investor must acquire control of a Canadian business through a “direct acquisition” of assets or equity and the aggregate book value of the assets being acquired, including assets situated outside of Canada, must exceed the applicable monetary threshold. A direct acquisition of control for the purpose of the ICA is the acquisition of a Canadian business by virtue of the acquisition of all or substantially all of its assets or a majority, or in some cases, one-third or more of the voting interests of a Canadian entity, provided that the entity directly or indirectly qualifies as a Canadian business for the purposes of the ICA.

If the acquisition of control of an existing business by a non-Canadian is not reviewable, so either the Canadian business is being acquired indirectly – provided that the Canadian business is not a cultural business – or the applicable monetary threshold is not exceeded, the transaction will be notifiable. Notification requires the non-Canadian investor to provide limited information to Investment Canada at any time before or within 30 days after closing the transaction.

In 2009, and again in June 2012, the government released for public consultation proposed amendments to the Investment Canada Regulations, which would implement amendments to the ICA that were passed in 2009. These amendments would move the current threshold for direct acquisitions by WTO investors (that is, investors controlled by persons who are citizens of WTO member countries) from a C$344 million book value of assets test to a C$600 million “enterprise value” threshold, increasing progressively to C$1 billion over a four-year period. The current asset-based financial thresholds of C$5 million will still apply for investments in cultural businesses. The government has not indicated when it will adopt the new regulations.

On April 29 2013, the government announced proposed amendments to the ICA, which do not extend the new enterprise value threshold to SOE investors, who will continue to be subject to the existing C$344-million book value of assets threshold (subject to an annual adjustment). In addition, the amendments create new powers for the Minister to make what are known as “control in fact” determinations in respect of SOE investors, potentially bringing more transactions by SOE investors within the purview of an ICA review.

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Net benefit to Canada

A reviewable transaction may not be completed unless the investment has been reviewed and the responsible Minister is satisfied that the investment is likely to be of “net benefit to Canada”. The non-Canadian investor must make an application to Investment Canada setting out, among other things, particulars of the proposed transaction and its post-closing plans for the Canadian business. The ICA requires the relevant Minister to take these factors into account, where relevant, when determining if an investment is likely to be of net benefit to Canada:

• The effect of the investment on the level and nature of economic activity in Canada, including, the effect on employment, on resource processing, on the utilisation of parts, components and services produced in Canada and on exports from Canada;

• The degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the Canadian business and in any industry or industries in Canada of which the Canadian business forms a part;

• The effect of the investment on productivity, industrial efficiency, technological development, product innovation and product variety in Canada;

• The effect of the investment on competition within any industry or industries in Canada;

• The compatibility of the investment with national industrial, economic and cultural policies, taking into consideration industrial, economic and cultural policy objectives enunciated by the government or legislature of any province likely to be significantly affected by the investment; and

• The contribution of the investment to Canada's ability to compete in world markets.

Once an application has been made, there is an initial waiting period of up to 45 days. The Minister can extend the waiting period unilaterally by 30 days, and the Minister and investor can agree to any additional period.

Although on its face the regime seems harsh, relatively few investments have proved to be problematic since the legislation was enacted in 1985. The practical negative effects are the reality of delay and negotiation. Generally speaking, the reviews typically extend beyond the initial 45 day period.

In addition, while undertakings are not mandatory under the ICA, in practice, the Minister requires the investor to commit to binding undertakings in virtually every reviewable transaction, in order to secure a net benefit determination. Undertakings typically govern the ongoing operation of the Canadian business and address, among other things, employment levels in Canada, participation by Canadians on the board of directors of the Canadian business and in senior management positions, the location of the head office, future capital expenditures and research and development in Canada by the Canadian business and continued community involvement. The precise scope of the undertakings and their duration are subject to negotiation between the investor and the Minister. According to guidelines established by Investment Canada, these undertakings will be reviewed by Investment Canada on a 12 to 18 month basis.

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State-owned enterprises

In 2007, Investment Canada released guidelines setting out supplementary considerations to qualify the net benefit criteria where the investor is an SOE. Pursuant to the Investment by state-owned enterprises – Net benefit assessment Guidelines (SOE Guidelines), the Minister will expect additional undertakings from SOE investors. In particular, the Minister will seek undertakings pertaining to the corporate governance and reporting structure of the SOE, how and to what extent the SOE is owned and controlled by a foreign state, and whether the Canadian business to be acquired will have the ability to continue operating on a commercial basis. From a governance perspective, the assessment will include whether the SOE adheres to Canadian standards of corporate governance, including its commitments to transparency and disclosure, independent members of the board of directors, independent audit committees and equitable treatment of shareholders. In addition, Investment Canada will evaluate whether the SOE adheres to Canadian laws and practices, as well as the effect of the investment on the level and nature of economic activity in Canada, including the effect on employment, production and capital levels in Canada. From a commercial orientation perspective, the Minister will assess whether the Canadian business to be acquired will continue to have the ability to operate on a commercial basis with respect to: (i) where to export; (ii) where to process; (iii) the participation of Canadians in its operations in Canada and elsewhere; (iv) the impact of the investment on productivity and industrial efficiency in Canada; (v) support of ongoing innovation, research and development and; (vi) the appropriate level of capital expenditures to maintain the Canadian business in a globally competitive position.

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Policy statement and revised SOE guidelines

On December 7 2012, the Canadian government released a Policy Statement and revised its SOE Guidelines, clarifying the foreign investment review process in Canada and signalling a shift in how investments by SOEs will be reviewed under the ICA. Among various amendments to the SOE Guidelines, the government broadened the definition of what may constitute an SOE to include “an enterprise that is owned, controlled or influenced, directly or indirectly” by a foreign government. This new definition, namely to include the term “influence”, introduces a potentially wide expansion to what may constitute an SOE.

The proposed amendments to the ICA that were announced on April 29 2013 expand the definition of what may constitute an SOE. In addition to capturing foreign governments and their agencies, the proposed definition of an SOE also includes any entity that is controlled or influenced, directly or indirectly, by such a government or agency, as well as “an individual who is acting under the direction of” or “who is acting under the influence of” such a government or agency. Unlike the concept of “control”, which is defined under the ICA, the concepts of “influence” and “direction” are potentially quite broad. Furthermore, neither term has been judicially considered under the ICA.

In addition, the government underscored that free market principles and industrial efficiency will be considered in reviews of investments by SOEs. In particular, the government will closely examine the degree of control or influence the SOE would likely exert over the Canadian business and on the industry and, most importantly, the extent to which the foreign state is likely to exercise control or influence over the SOE.

Essentially, under the revised SOE Guidelines, an SOE investor must be able to demonstrate the following commitments, which will need to be reflected in its undertakings with the Minister:

• The Canadian business must remain commercially oriented such that decisions will be made on a commercial basis.

• The Canadian business must be free from political influence.

• The Canadian business will adhere to Canadian laws and practices, including free market principles.

• The investor will adopt standards and practices to promote sound corporate governance and transparency.

• The investment will lead to positive contributions on the productivity and industrial efficiency of the Canadian business.

The government also announced that foreign state control of Canadian oil sands has reached a point at which further such state control generally would not be of net benefit to Canada and, going forward, acquisitions of control of Canadian oil sands businesses by SOEs will satisfy the net benefit test only under exceptional circumstances. Outside of the oil sands, there are no sector-specific restrictions on acquisitions of control by SOEs, although all reviewable investments by SOEs will be scrutinised closely.

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National security review

As of March 2009, the Minister also may review any investment, regardless of size, where the Minister has reasonable grounds to believe that the investment could be “injurious to national security”. In doing so, the Minister may require that the investor provide any additional information considered necessary for the review.

The Minister may refer the transaction to the Governor in Council (the executive branch of the Canadian federal government) for review. The Governor in Council then may take any measures considered advisable to protect national security including: (1) blocking the transaction (where the investment has not been implemented), (2) authorising the transaction on the basis of written undertakings or other terms and conditions, or (3) ordering a divestiture of the Canadian business (where the investment has been implemented).

The term “national security” is not defined in the ICA and there has been some concern that the national security provisions of the ICA would not be limited to acquisitions affecting only national defence, but possibly capture economic, infrastructural, environmental (e.g., natural resources) or other notions of “national security”.

The Minister has 45 days, plus a notice period, after receiving notice of the investment (or after implementation of the investment, if an application for review or notification is not required or, in the case of a notification, filed in advance) to initiate national security review. The proposed amendments to the ICA that were announced on April 29 2013 also extend the time period during which the Minister must make a net benefit determination in connection with an investment undergoing a national security review by 25 days, and introduce additional flexibility for the Minister and an investor to agree to an even longer timeline for concurrent reviews. According to the government's policy statement of December 7 2012, the government will only use the new flexibility under the national security review timelines in “exceptional circumstances”.

We are aware of only one transaction since the new regime came into force where an investment was terminated owing to a national security review – George Forrest International Afrique's proposed acquisition of Forsys Metals and its uranium assets in Namibia. The nature of the Minister's concerns has not been disclosed publicly and the review, like the transaction, was never completed.

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Enhanced transparency and enforcement

On June 29 2012, amendments to the ICA that are designed to increase transparency of the review process came into force. In particular, the amendments allow the Minister to provide public notice of his decision to approve a reviewable transaction or reject it on the grounds that it does not constitute a net benefit to Canada, as well as reasons for any such provisional decision. In addition, the amendments allow the Minister to accept security from a foreign investor to ensure compliance with the investor's undertakings.

If an investor fails to honour its undertakings, the ICA allows the Minister to demand that the investor comply with the undertakings or justify any non-compliance. Where the investor does not fulfil the demand, the Minister can agree to new undertakings by the investor, or else bring an application to a superior court for a range of remedies, including divestiture, an order requiring compliance and a penalty of up to C$10,000 per day for each breach.

In recognition of the potentially lengthy and costly litigation process, on May 25 2012, the government issued Mediation Guidelines, introducing a formal mediation process as an alternative to litigation where the Minister believes that an investor has failed to comply with its commitments. The guidelines allow the Minister and the investor to enter into an agreement to mediate if both parties believe that mediation may assist in resolving a dispute relating to compliance with undertakings. The Minister then may either accept new undertakings as a result of the mediation process, or demand that the investor comply with its prior commitments or justify non-compliance. If the investor fails to act in accordance with the Minister's demand, the Minister still may initiate court proceedings. Taken together, these changes reflect a shift towards greater transparency and more effective enforcement under the ICA.

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Going forward

All non-Canadian investors need to take into account the going-forward costs of adhering to undertakings when negotiating agreements that are subject to approval under the ICA and factor these costs into the economics of the transaction. Vendors also may negotiate participation rights in a transaction agreement to ensure that SOE investors make appropriate commitments to secure ICA approval.

Investors that propose to acquire interests in Canadian businesses involved in sensitive areas, such as uranium extraction, technology, or possibly critical infrastructure, may face scrutiny under the national security review provisions of the ICA, even if those interests are not controlling ones.

In addition, and as demonstrated by recent high-profile transactions (including BHP Billiton's proposed acquisition of Potash Corporation and LSE's proposed acquisition of TMX), other stakeholders can play an influential role in the net benefit determination under the ICA. These recent transactions demonstrate that the review process under the ICA is grounded not only in legal considerations but also in political and economic considerations. The investor's advisory team needs to reflect this dynamic.

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Additional considerations for SOE investors

The political concerns over SOE investment in Canada and elsewhere have been the result of a perceived lack of transparency of SOE motivations and doubts as to their accountability standards, adherence to corporate and international norms and anti-corruption protections. Concerns about SOE investment continue to persist in the media and some SOEs might be discouraged from investing in Canada due to the perception that the regulatory approval process will be challenging and complex.

Investment Canada should be expected to continue to insist that Chinese SOE investors commit to transparent corporate governance and a commercial orientation for the Canadian business for so long as they hold a controlling interest in a Canadian business, in addition to the standard undertakings related to employment, capital expenditures and other undertakings, often required of investors.

Nevertheless, as recent experience shows, these concerns can be overcome. A well-planned government relations and communications strategy, coordinated by counsel working closely with the non-Canadian investor, can mitigate the likelihood of a transaction being derailed for political reasons. Indeed, the importance of a well-developed strategic approach to obtaining appropriate approvals cannot be underestimated, both when promoting the transaction and negotiating undertakings, and securing Ministerial approval.



Author biographies

Calvin S. Goldman Q.C.

Partner

Calvin S. Goldman Q.C. is co-chair of Blakes competition, antitrust and foreign investment group. He began his professional career at Blakes in 1976, after he clerked for Justice Spence of the Supreme Court of Canada. He remained with Blakes specialising in antitrust litigation until 1986, when he was appointed to be the Director (since renamed to Commissioner) of the Competition Bureau in the Canadian government. He returned to private practice in 1990. Cal's practice covers all aspects of Canadian competition law, including domestic and international mergers, abuse of dominance, cartels, civil reviewable matters and counselling on trade practices, as well as representation in foreign investment reviews under the Investment Canada Act.

Jason Gudofsky

Partner

Jason Gudofsky is a partner in Blakes competition, antitrust and foreign investment group. He advises domestic and foreign firms on all aspects of competition law. He regularly provides strategic advice to firms involved in merger and joint venture transactions, including providing risk assessments, navigating reviews through the Canadian Competition Bureau and, where appropriate, coordinating and working with economists and foreign counsel. In addition to advising on mergers, Jason provides advice on all other aspects of competition law, including in respect of strategic alliances, unilateral conduct, cartel investigations and compliance matters. He has been involved in the negotiation of complex remedies and orders with the Competition Bureau and before the Competition Tribunal in the context of both mergers and cartel investigations.

Jason advises foreign and Canadian vendors under the Investment Canada Act and represents clients before the Investment Review Division of Industry Canada and the Cultural Sector Investment Review branch of Canadian Heritage. He has negotiated undertakings in a wide range of industries to secure “net benefit to Canada” determinations.

Michael Laffin

Partner

Mike Laffin is a partner in Blakes energy group and chair of Blakes Asia region practice. He provides strategic corporate and energy advice to Canadian and international oil and gas companies, and has extensive experience negotiating, structuring, advising, and opining on all aspects of conventional and unconventional oil and gas matters. He has in-depth knowledge of all aspects of the Canadian oil sands, LNG and marketing in Canada, midstream and infrastructure issues, petroleum and natural gas joint ventures and acquisition and divestment of assets and corporations. Mike has negotiated and supervised large-scale projects related to domestic, international and offshore transactions, joint ventures, take-over bids and financings. He is very involved in resource and trade matters involving Asia.

对加拿大净利益的投资

高凯文、古杰 和 马乐飞

布雷克律师事务所

近年来，中国（主要是中国国有企业（SOE））对加拿大的外商直接投资 (FDI) 急剧增长，从 2004 年的 1.13 亿加元增长到了 2011 年的 109 亿加元，导致此等增长的首要原因是投资者对加拿大自然资源领域日益浓厚的兴趣。过去几年来的几笔重大投资突显了中国对加拿大 FDI 的增长，例如中国石油化工股份有限公司（中石化）于 2011 年以 22 亿加元收购加拿大常规油气生产商Daylight Energy以及中国海洋石油总公司（中海油）于 2011 年以 21 亿加元收购阿尔伯塔省油砂开发商 OPTI Canada。最近，加拿大工业部长于 2012 年 12 月 7 日批准了中海油拟以 151 亿美元收购 Nexen Inc.的交易，该笔交易是迄今为止中国国有企业规模最大的海外收购。各种迹象均表明中国对加拿大的外商投资态势将持续，并可能进一步增加。随著能源需求的继续增长，这种趋势将日益突出。

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对外商投资日益强化的审查

来自中国的投资增长发生于政府及公众对外商投资的审查强化之际。2012 年 3 月，加拿大首席执行官协会 (the Canadian Council of Chief Executives) 公布了一份名为《中国对加拿大的外商直接投资：威胁还是机遇？》(Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Canada: Threat or Opportunity?) 的报告，审视亚洲不断崛起的经济对加拿大的影响。作者呼籲联邦政府不要将外商投资审查程序政治化，并制定合理的国家安全审查标准。

SOE的投资受到严格的审查，但外商投资方面的担忧不限于SOE。加拿大政府于 2010 年否决英澳矿业公司必和必拓 (BHP Billiton) 拟收购加拿大钾肥公司 (Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan) 的交易的初步决定引起了广泛的争议（必和必拓最终撤消了其对该加拿大公司的收购要约），并表明政府将毫不犹豫地否决其认为不会给加拿大带来净利益的交易。

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更紧密的经济联系

本届加拿大政府对加强与中国的经济联系以及扩大外商对加拿大投资颇为关注。2012 年 2 月，加拿大总理哈珀 (Stephen Harper) 与中国总理温家宝签订了一系列双边协议，其中包括能源、自然资源、高科技、创新及农业方面的合作协议。双方还结束了历时18年的的谈判旨在达成最终的《中加外商投资促进与保护协定》（FIPA），并由加拿大国际贸易部长兼亚太门户部长艾德•法斯特（Ed Fast）及中国商务部长陈德铭于2012年9月8日签订了此协定。FIPA 的目的在于在避免歧视性待遇方面为外国投资者提供更好的保护，并提高影响外国投资者及其投资的政策框架的可预测性。中加FIPA已于2012年9月26日提交加拿大国会，目前正等待国会批准。

此外，加拿大与中国于 2012 年 8 月 15 日发布了中加经济互补性联合研究报告 (Economic Complementarities Study)，强调潜在的双边经济互补性及增长前景。该研究报告探讨了七个经济领域（包括自然资源、机械设备、交通运输、基础设施、航空、清洁技术及环保产品与服务），并表示此等研究的完成为探讨加中经贸关系的深化奠定了基础。报告的结论是，“加拿大及中国政府应通过双边手段继续深化和加强双边贸易与投资关系，以确保两国人民能继续建设繁荣富强、可持续发展的未来。”

加拿大政府还于 2012 年 11 月 11 日与香港签订了期待已久的避免双重征税方面的协定。该协定将促进双方的贸易与投资，特别是香港对加拿大的投资，还可能为中国企业对加拿大的某些投资提供新的机遇。

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ICA 项下的外商投资

《加拿大投资法》（Investment Canada Act，“ICA”） 是一部广泛适用于规范非加拿大人设立加拿大企业或收购加拿大企业控制权的联邦法律。除涉及文化企业的交易外，加拿大工业部投资审查局（Investment Review Division of Industry Canada，也称加拿大投资局-Investment Canada）在工业部长的指导下负责实施 ICA。若交易涉及与加拿大文化遗产或国民认同相关的商业活动（例如出版、电影、视频、音乐及广播等业务），则由加拿大文化遗产部（Department of Canadian Heritage，“文化遗产部”）文化产业投资审查局 (Cultural Sector Investment Review) 在文化遗产部部长的指导下管理。适用ICA的投资要么需通过审查，要么需申报。若需审查，则必须同时履行报告义务以及交割前审批程序，若需申报，则只需履行交割后的报告义务。无论是需通过审查还是需经申报，非加拿大投资者的所有涉及加拿大实体的投资均可能须经国家安全审查，甚至既不需要通过审查也无需申报的交易也是如此。与“控制权”收购及判定投资者是否为“加拿大人”的相关规则十分庞杂。

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法律框架

一般而言，只有当非加拿大投资者通过“直接收购”资产或股权收购加拿大企业的控制权，并且被收购的资产（包括位于加拿大以外的资产）的账面价值超过适用的金额门槛时，交易才需经审查。ICA规定，“直接收购控制权”是指通过收购加拿大企业的全部或实质上全部资产，或收购加拿大实体（只要此等实体直接或间接符合ICA规定的加拿大企业的构成条件）有表决权的多数权益（或者，在某些情形下三分之一以上的权益即可）的方式收购该企业。

如非加拿大投资者收购现有加拿大企业控制权的交易无需审查（即加拿大企业不是文化企业并被间接收购，或者交易未超过适用的金额门槛），则此等交易必须申报。申报要求非加拿大投资者在交易交割前或交割后30日内的任何时间向投资审核处提供有限的信息。

政府于 2009 年发布了《加拿大投资法条例》（Investment Canada Regulations）修订提案的征求公众意见稿，并于 2012 年再次发布了此等修订。这些修订将实施 2009 年通过的对 ICA 的修订。此等对 ICA 的修订将 WTO 投资者（即由 WTO 成员国的公民控制的投资者）的直接收购的审查门槛标准从目前的3.44亿加元的账面价值的资产标准提高至6亿加元（将在四年的期限内逐渐升至10亿加元）的“企业价值”标准。目前以资产为基础的500万加元的金额门槛将继续适用于文化产业的投资。政府尚未说明其何时将采用新条例。

2013年4月29日，政府宣布了对ICA的修正案，该修正案没有将新的企业价值门槛延伸适用于SOE投资者，后者将继续适用目前的3.44亿加元资产账面价值（将逐年调整）的门槛。此外，该修正案使部长具有新的权力对SOE投资者作出所谓“事实上的控制”的认定，这可能使更多的SOE投资者的交易被纳入ICA审查的管辖范围。

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加拿大净受益

对于需通过审查的交易而言，除非投资已经过审查，并且负责的部长满意地认为投资很可能“对加拿大净受益”，则不得进行交易的交割。非加拿大投资者必须向加拿大投资局提交一份申请，列明拟议的交易详情以及投资者为加拿大企业制定的交割后计划等。ICA要求负责的部长在决定某项投资是否很可能使加拿大净受益时考虑下列相应因素：

• 投资对加拿大经济活动水平及性质的影响，包括对就业、资源加工、加拿大生产的部件、元件及服务的使用以及加拿大出口的影响；

• 加拿大人在该加拿大企业中（以及在该加拿大企业所在的一个或多个加拿大产业中）的参与程度及重要性；

• 投资对加拿大生产率、行业效率、技术进步、产品创新及产品多样性的影响；

• 投资对一个或多个行业内的竞争的影响；

• 该投资与国家产业、经济及文化政策的兼容性，要考虑到投资对任何省的政府或立法机关所公布的产业、经济及文化政策目标可能产生的重大影响；

• 投资对加拿大在全球市场的竞争能力的贡献。

申请提交后，将有最多达45天的初始等待期。部长可单方面将等待期延长30天，此外，部长和投资者还可协商确定任何进一步的延期。

尽管制度上看起来似乎很苛刻，但自1985年颁行《加拿大投资法》以来，少有投资被认定为存在问题。实践中的负面影响是，它的确导致了延误和协商。一般而言，审查会超过其45天的初始期限。

此外，虽然 ICA 并未强制性地要求投资者作出承诺，但在实践中，部长几乎会在每笔须经审查的交易中要求投资者作出有约束力的承诺以取得净利益认定。承诺通常涵盖加拿大企业的日常运营并明确其在加拿大的雇佣水平、加拿大人对加拿大企业董事会的参与及在高管层的任职、总部地点、未来在加拿大的资本支出及研发活动、持续的社区参与等问题。承诺的具体范围及期限取决于投资者与部长之间的谈判。根据加拿大投资局制定的指引，该局将以 12 至 18 个月为周期评估此等承诺的履行。

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国有企业

2007年，加拿大投资局发布指引，列明了进一步界定适用于国有企业 （SOE）投资者的“净利益”标准的补充考虑因素。根据《国有企业投资 – 净利益评估指引》（Investment by state-owned enterprises – Net benefit assessment Guidelines，“《SOE指引》”），部长将要求SOE投资者作出更多的承诺。特别是，部长将寻求SOE的公司治理及报告结构、外国政府如何以及在何等程度上拥有及控制该SOE、以及被收购的加拿大企业是否能继续在商业运营等方面作出承诺。在治理方面，评估的内容包括SOE是否遵守加拿大的公司治理标准，包括透明度与披露、独立董事、独立审计委员会以及公平对待股东方面的承诺。此外，加拿大投资局还将评估SOE是否遵守加拿大法律及惯例，以及投资对加拿大经济活动水平和性质的影响，包括对加拿大就业、生产及资本水平的影响。从商业取向的角度而言，部长将从以下方面评估被收购的加拿大企业是否能继续在商业运营：(i) 向何处出口；(ii) 在何处加工；(iii) 加拿大人对加拿大及国外运营的参与；(iv) 投资对加拿大生产率及行业效率的影响；(v) 对创新及研发的持续支持；(vi) 旨在保持加拿大企业全球竞争地位的适当的资本支出水平。

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政策声明及经修订的《SOE 指引》

2012年12月7日，加拿大联邦政府发布了一项政策声明并修订了其《SOE 指引》，就加拿大的外商投资审查程序作出了澄清并发出了改变ICA项下SOE投资审查方式的信号。在对《SOE指引》的各项修订中，政府拓宽了SOE的定义，使之包括外国政府“直接或间接拥有、控制或影响的企业”。此等新定义（即在定义中包含“影响”一词）使得 SOE 的范围可能被大大拓宽。

2013年4月29日宣布的ICA修正案扩大了SOE的定义。除了包含了外国政府及其代理机构在内，拟议的SOE定义还包括了受上述政府或代理机构直接或间接控制或影响的任何实体，以及在上述政府或代理机构的“指示下行事的个人”或在上述政府或代理机构的“影响下行事的个人”。与ICA下定义的“控制”的概念不同，“影响”和“指示”的概念有可能很广泛。而且，这两个用语也都未在ICA下经法院解释过。

此外，政府强调在审查SOE投资时将考虑自由市场规则及行业效率。特别是，政府将密切关注SOE将对加拿大企业及其所在行业发挥的控制或影响的程度，以及最为重要的外国政府可能控制或影响SOE的程度。

根据经修订的《SOE指引》，SOE投资者必须能够表明下述承诺，并将其体现在投资者对部长的承诺之中：

• 加拿大企业必须保持其商业取向，从而在商业基础上作出决策。

• 加拿大企业必须不受政治影响。

• 加拿大企业将遵守加拿大法律和惯例，包括自由市场原则。

• 投资者将采用标准与惯例，以促进良好的公司治理及透明度。

• 投资将对加拿大企业的生产率及行业效率作出积极贡献。

政府还宣布，外国对加拿大油砂的控制已达到了一定的程度，以致于进一步的外国控制一般而言将不会给加拿大带来净利益。换句话说，SOE对加拿大油砂企业控制权的收购将仅在例外情形下才会满足净利益标准。虽然SOE的所有需审查投资均将被仔细审核，但除油砂外，没有特别限制 SOE 收购其他行业企业的控制权。

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国家安全审查

从2009年3月起，部长若有合理的依据认为某项投资可能“危害国家安全”，也可对其进行审查，无论投资的规模如何。为此，部长可要求投资者提供为开展此等审查而被视为必需的任何额外的信息。

部长可将交易提交给院督（Governor in Council，加拿大联邦政府的行政分支）审查。院督可随即采取任何被视为可取的措施以保护国家安全，其中包括：（1）阻止该交易（若交易尚未实施的话），（2）基于书面承诺或其他条件批准交易，或（3）命令剥离加拿大企业（若交易已实施的话）。

ICA 并未对“国家安全”一词进行界定，一直存在的一种担忧是，ICA的国家安全条款的适用不会被仅仅限定于影响国防的收购，还可能会涉及经济、基础设施、环境（例如自然资源）或“国家安全”的其他内涵。

部长可在收到申报后（或投资实施后，若投资无需申请审查或申报，或事先已申报的话）45天（外加通知期）内启动国家安全审查。2013年4月29日发布的ICA修正案还将部长必须对接受国家安全审查的投资作出净利益认定的期限延长了25日，并为部长与投资者提供了额外的灵活性就同时进行的审查商定更长的期限。根据政府2012年12月7日的政策声明，政府只会在“例外情况”下运用国家安全审查期限的新灵活性。

据我们所知，自新制度生效以来仅有一项交易因国家安全审查而被终止，即George Forrest International Afrique 拟收购Forsys Metals及其纳米比亚铀资产的交易。部长所关切的问题的性质尚未公开披露，并且审查（与交易一样）一直未完成。

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透明度的提高与执法的强化

2012年6月29日，旨在提高审查程序透明度的ICA修订生效。特别是，此等修订允许部长公告其批准须经审查的交易的决定，或以其将不会使加拿大净受益为由拒绝批准交易的决定，以及任何此等临时决定的理由。此外，修订还允许部长接受外国投资者提供的担保，以确保投资者遵守其承诺。

若投资者未履行其承诺，ICA允许部长要求遵守其承诺或纠正任何不合规情形。若投资者未满足此等要求，部长可同意由投资者作出新的承诺，否则可向高等法院申请一系列补救措施，包括剥离、要求遵守承诺的命令、以及针对每项违反课以最高可达每日1万加元的罚款。

意识到诉讼程序可能耗费时日且费用高昂，政府于2012年5月25日发布了《调解指引》（Mediation Guidelines），在部长认为投资者违反了其承诺的情况下，可以采用正式的调解程序，作为诉讼的替代性选择。若部长和投资者双方均认为调解可能有助于解决与承诺遵守相关的争议，则双方可根据此等指引签订调解协议。随后，部长可根据调解程序的结果接受新的承诺，或要求投资者遵守其此前的承诺或纠正违反行为。若投资者未遵照部长的要求行事，部长仍可提起法院诉讼。综合来看，这些修订体现了向ICA项下更高透明度和更有效执法的转变。

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前瞻

在洽谈需根据ICA取得审批的协议的过程中，所有非加拿大投资者均应考虑遵守承诺的成本，并将此等成本纳入交易的经济评估内。服务商也可通过谈判在交易协议中订入参与权条款，以确保国有企业投资者为取得ICA审批而作出适当的承诺。

拟收购涉足铀矿开采、高科技（或许还包括关键性基础设施）等敏感领域的加拿大企业权益的投资者可能面临ICA国家安全审查条款规定的审查，即使拟收购的并非控制性权益亦是如此。

此外，最近的一些备受瞩目的交易（包括必和必拓拟收购加拿大钾肥公司以及伦敦证券交易所拟收购多伦多证券交易所的交易）表明，其他利益相关者能对 ICA 项下的净利益判定发挥重要的影响。最近的这些交易表明ICA项下的审查程序所依据的不仅包括法定考虑因素，而且还包括政治和经济考虑因素。投资者的顾问团队需要仔细考虑此等规律。

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SOE 投资者的额外考虑因素

由于公众认为SOE的行为动机缺乏透明度，并对其问责标准、遵守公司及国际准则的能力以及反腐败能力存在疑虑，SOE投资在加拿大及其他国家引起了政治上的担忧。对SOE投资的担忧持续不断地见诸媒体。一些SOE可能会认为监管审批流程困难重重且情况复杂，其投资于加拿大的积极性也可能会因此而受到挫伤。

除了通常要求投资者作出的与雇佣、资本支出等事项相关的标准承诺以外，加拿大投资局预期将继续坚持要求中国SOE投资者承诺在其持有加拿大企业控制性权益期间保持此等企业的透明公司治理和商业取向。

但是，最近的经验表明，这些担忧是可以克服的。只要法律顾问能与非加拿大投资者紧密协作，协调执行良好的政府关系及公众沟通战略，即可降低交易因政治因素而流产的风险。事实上，在促成交易、洽谈承诺及取得部长审批的过程中，投资者绝不能低估良好的策略方法对于取得相关审批而言的重要性。

作者简历

高凯文 (御用大律师)

合伙人

高凯文御用大律师是布雷克竞争法、反垄断法与外商投资团队联合主席。他于 1976 年在布雷克开始其职业生涯，此前他曾担任加拿大最高法院 Spence 法官的书记官。高律师在布雷克专注于反垄断诉讼直至 1986 年。该年内，他被任命为加拿大政府竞争局 (Competition Bureau) 局长（后来改称“专员”）。1990 年，他重新进入私营法律服务部门。高律师的执业活动涉及加拿大竞争法的所有领域，包括国内及国际并购、滥用市场支配地位、卡特尔、民事复核事项、贸易惯例咨询以及《加拿大投资法》(Investment Canada Act) 项下外商投资审查程序中的代理。

古杰

合伙人

古杰是布雷克竞争法、反垄断法与外商投资团队合伙人。他就竞争法的所有方面为国内外企业提供法律服务。他经常为涉及合并及合营交易的企业提供战略咨询，包括协助客户开展风险评估、通过加拿大竞争局 (Competition Bureau) 的审查以及在必要时与经济学家及外国律师开展协调和协作。除提供合并法律服务以外，古律师的法律服务还涵盖竞争法的所有其他领域，包括战略联盟、单边行为、卡特尔调查及合规事务。他曾在合并及卡特尔调查过程中就复杂的救济及命令开展与竞争局的谈判，并在竞争法庭 (Competition Tribunal) 代表客户。

在根据《加拿大投资法》(Investment Canada Act) 及相关指引（包括与外国国有企业在加拿大的投资相关的指引）为外国投资者及加拿大卖方提供法律服务方面，古律师也十分活跃。他曾为各行各业的交易商讨承诺事项，以取得加拿大净利益认定。

马乐飞

合伙人

马乐飞是布雷克能源团队合伙人及亚洲区负责人。他为加拿大及国际油气公司提供公司及能源方面的战略法律服务，且在就所有传统及非传统油气事务提供谈判、结构设计、咨询服务及法律意见方面具有丰富的经验。对于加拿大油砂、液化天然气 (LNG) 及其加拿大营销、中游及基础设施事务、石油及天然气合营及资产与公司收购与剥离，马律师有着全面、深入的认识。马律师曾参与大型国内、国际及离岸交易、合营、要约收购及融资项目的谈判以及交易执行的监督。他还广泛参与涉及亚洲的资源及贸易事务。